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Abstract
This paper studies predatory trading : trading that induces and/or exploits
other investors’ need to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs
to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price
overshooting and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence,
the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader profits
from triggering another trader’s crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders
and across markets.
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1 Introduction
Large traders fear a forced liquidation, especially if their need to liquidate is known
by other traders. For example, hedge funds with (nearing) margin calls may need to
liquidate, and this could be known to certain counterparties such as the bank financing
the trade; similarly, traders who use portfolio insurance, stop loss orders, or other
risk management strategies can be known to liquidate in response to price drops; a
short-seller may need to cover his position if the price increases significantly or if
his share is recalled (i.e., a “short squeeze”); certain institutions have an incentive
to liquidate bonds that are downgraded or in default; and intermediaries who take
on large derivative positions must hedge them by trading the underlying security. A
forced liquidation is often very costly since it is associated with large price impact and
low liquidity.
We provide a new framework for studying the strategic interaction between large
traders. Traders are large in the sense of having market impact and they trade continu-
ously, limiting their trading intensity to minimize temporary price impact costs. Some
of the traders may end up in financial difficulty, and the resulting need to liquidate is
known by the other strategic traders.
Our analysis shows that if a distressed large investor is forced to unwind his posi-
tion (and needs liquidity the most), then other strategic traders initially trade in the
same direction. That is, to profit from price swings, other traders conduct predatory
trading and withdraw liquidity instead of providing it. This predatory activity makes
liquidation costly and leads to price overshooting. Moreover, predatory trading can
even induce the distressed trader’s need to liquidate, and hence, predatory trading
can enhance the risk of financial crisis. We show that predation is profitable if the
distressed trader’s position is large relative to the capacity on the sideline, and if the
market is illiquid, and that predation is most fierce if there are few predators.
These findings are in line with anecdotal evidence as summarized in Table 1. A
well-known example is the alleged trading against LTCM’s positions in the fall of 1998.
Business Week wrote:
“... if lenders know that a hedge fund needs to sell something quickly,
they will sell the same asset – driving the price down even faster. Goldman,
Sachs & Co. and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in 1998.”1
Cramer (2002) describes hedge funds’ predatory intentions in colorful terms:
“When you smell blood in the water, you become a shark. ... when you
know that one of your number is in trouble ... you try to figure out what
he owns and you start shorting those stocks ...”
1“The Wrong Way to Regulate Hedge Funds”, Business Week, February 26th, 2001, page 90.
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Also, Cai (2002) finds that “locals” on the CBOE pits exploited knowledge of LTCM’s
short positions in the treasury bond futures market. Another indication of the fear
of predatory trading is evident in the opposition to UBS Warburg’s proposal to take
over Enron’s traders without taking over its trading positions. This proposal was
opposed on the grounds that “it would present a ‘predatory trading risk’ because
Enron’s traders would effectively know the contents of the trading book.”2 Similarly,
many institutional investors are forced by law or their own charter to sell bonds of
companies which undergo debt restructuring procedures. Hradsky and Long (1989)
documents price overshooting in the bond market after default announcements.
Furthermore, our model shows that an adverse wealth shock to one large trader,
coupled with predatory trading, can lead to a price drop that brings other traders
in financial difficulty, leading to further predation, and so on. This ripple effect can
cause a widespread crisis in the financial sector. Consistently, the testimony of Alan
Greenspan in the U.S. House of Representatives on Oct. 1st, 1998 indicates that the
Federal Reserve Bank was worried that LTCM’s financial difficulties might destabilize
the financial system as a whole:
“. . . the act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio would not only have a sig-
nificant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process could
produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counterpar-
ties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved with
LTCM.”
Also, the Brady report (Brady et al. (1988), p.15) suggests that the 1987 stock
market crash was partly due to predatory trading in the spirit of our model:
“. . . This precipitous decline began with several “triggers,” which ignited
mechanical, price-insensitive selling by a number of institutions following
portfolio insurance strategies and a small number of mutual fund groups.
The selling by these investors, and the prospect of further selling by them,
encouraged a number of aggressive trading-oriented institutions to sell in
anticipation of further declines. These aggressive trading-oriented insti-
tutions included, in addition to hedge funds, a small number of pension
and endowment funds, money management firms and investment banking
houses. This selling in turn stimulated further reactive selling by portfolio
insurers and mutual funds.”
Predation risk affects the optimal risk management strategy for large institutional
investors who hold illiquid assets. The optimal risk management strategy should de-
pend on the liquidity of the assets and on positions and financial standing of other
2AFX News Limited, AFX – Asia, January 18th, 2002.
3
large investors. Further, risk managers should consider the risk that fund outflows can
lead to predatory trading, resulting in losses that could fuel further outflows, and so
on. Hence, the more likely fund outflows are, the more liquid the fund’s asset holdings
should be. The danger of predatory trading might make it impossible for a fund to raise
money in order to temporarily bridge some financial short-falls since it has to reveal
its financial need. More generally, the possibility of predatory trading is an argument
against very strict disclosure policy. In the same spirit, the disclosure guidelines of the
IAFE Investor Risk Committee (IRC (2001)) maintain that “large hedge funds need to
limit granularity of reporting to protect themselves against predatory trading against
the fund’s position.” Likewise, market makers at the London Stock Exchange prefer to
delay the reporting of large transactions since it gives them “a chance to reduce a large
exposure, rather than alerting the rest of the market and exposing them to predatory
trading tactics from others.”3
Our model also provides guidance for the valuation of large security positions. We
distinguish between three forms of value, with increasing emphasis on the position’s liq-
uidity. Specifically, the “paper value” is the current mark-to-market value of a position;
the “orderly liquidation value” reflects the revenue one could achieve by secretly liq-
uidating the position; and the “distressed liquidation value” equals the amount which
can be raised if one faces predation by other strategic traders, that is, with endogenous
market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, the paper value exceeds the
orderly liquidation value, which exceeds the distressed liquidation value. Hence, if a
large trader estimates “impact costs” based on normal (orderly) market behavior then
he may underestimate his actual cost in case of an acute need to sell because preda-
tion makes liquidity time-varying. In particular, predation reduces liquidity when large
traders need it the most. Consistently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Acharya and
Pedersen (2002) find measures of liquidity risk to be priced.
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, our model provides
a natural example of “destabilizing speculation” by showing that although strategic
traders stabilize prices most of the time, their predatory behavior can destabilize prices
in times of financial crisis. This contributes to an old debate, see Friedman (1953), Hart
and Kreps (1986), and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). Trading
based on private information about security fundamentals is studied by Kyle (1985),
whereas, in our model, agents trade to profit from their information about the future
order flow coming from the distressed traders. Order flow information is also studied by
Madrigal (1996), Vayanos (2001), and Cao, Evans, and Lyons (2003) but these papers
do not consider the strategic effects of forced liquidation. The notion of predatory
trading partially overlaps with that of stock price manipulation, which is investigated
by Allen and Gale (1992) among others. One distinctive feature of predatory trading
is that the predator derives profit from the price impact of the prey and not from his
3Financial Times, June 5th, 1990, section I, page 12.
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own price impact. Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2002) and Pritsker (2003) are close in
spirit to our paper. Pritsker (2003) also finds price overshooting in an example with
heterogeneous risk-averse traders. Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2002) focus, in a two-
period model, on a distressed trader’s incentive to buy in order to temporarily push
up the price when facing a margin constraint, and a competitor’s incentive to trade
in the opposite direction and to lend to this trader. The systemic risk component of
our paper is related to the literature on financial crisis. Bernardo and Welch (2002)
provide a simple model of “financial market runs” in which traders join a run out of
fear of having to liquidate before the price recovers, and Morris and Shin (2003) study
how sales can reinforce sales using global games techniques.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 provides a preliminary result which simplifies the analysis. Section 4 derives
the equilibrium and discusses the nature of predatory trading, with both single and
multiple predators. Further, it shows how predation can drive an otherwise solvent
trader into financial distress and create a crisis for the whole market. It also high-
lights the implications for risk management strategies. Section 5 studies the difference
between orderly and distressed liquidation value. Section 6 considers the whole game
including the build up of the traders’ positions and touches upon disclosure require-
ments. Front-running, circuit breakers, uptick rule and contagion are discussed in
Section 7. Detailed proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
We consider a continuous-time economy with two assets: a riskless bond and a risky
asset. For simplicity, we normalize the risk-free rate to zero. The risky asset has an
aggregate supply of S > 0 and a final payoff v at time T , where v is a random variable5
with an expected value of E(v) = µ. One can view the risky asset as the payoff
associated with an arbitrage strategy consisting of multiple assets. The price of the
risky asset at time t is denoted by p (t). The economy has two kinds of agents: large
strategic traders (arbitrageurs) and long-term investors. We can think of the strategic
traders as hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, and the long-term investors as
pension funds and individual investors.
Strategic traders, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, are risk-neutral and seek to maximize their ex-
pected profit. Each strategic trader is large, and hence, his trading impacts the equi-
librium price. He therefore acts strategically and takes his price impact into account
when trading. Each strategic trader i has a given initial endowment, xi(0), of the risky
asset and he can continuously trade the asset by choosing his trading intensity, ai (t).
4Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that bubbles can persist in a dynamic global game.
5All random variables are defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P).
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Hence, at time t, his position, xi (t), in the risky asset is
xi (t) = xi (0) +
∫ t
0
ai(τ)dτ . (1)
We assume that each large strategic trader is restricted to hold
xi(t) ∈ [−x¯, x¯] . (2)
This position limit can be interpreted more broadly as a risk limit or a capital con-
straint. The specific constraint on asset holdings is not crucial for our results. What is
crucial is that strategic traders cannot take unlimited positions because, if they could,
they would drive the price to the expected value p = µ, a trivial outcome. To consider
the case of limited capital, we assume that x¯I < S.
Strategic traders are subject to a risk of financial distress. We consider both the
case in which an exogenous set of agents is in distress (Section 4.1) and the case of
endogenous distress (Section 4.2). In any case, we denote the set of distressed traders
by Id and the set of unaffected traders, the “predators ”, by Ip. Similarly, the number
of distressed traders is Id and the number of predators is Ip. A strategic trader in
financial distress must liquidate his position in the risky asset, that is,
i ∈ Id ⇒


ai(t) ≤ −A
I
if x(t) > 0 and t > t0
ai(t) = 0 if x(t) = 0 and t > t0
ai(t) ≥ A
I
if x(t) < 0 and t > t0
(3)
where A ∈ R is a number that determines the minimum liquidation speed (and which
is also related to the market structure described below). This statement says that a
distressed trader must liquidate his position at least as fast as A/I until he reaches
his final position xi (T ) = 0. Below, we show that this is the fastest that an agent can
liquidate without risking temporary price impact costs.6
The assumption of forced liquidation can be explained by (external or internal)
agency problems. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that an optimal financial con-
tract may leave an agent cash constrained even if the agent is subject to predation
risk.7 Also, the need to liquidate can be the result of a company’s own risk manage-
ment policy. We note that our results do not depend qualitatively on the nature of
the troubled agents’ liquidation strategy, nor do they depend on the assumption that
such agents must liquidate their entire position. It suffices that a troubled large trader
must reduce his position before time T .
6We will see later that, in equilibrium, a troubled trader who must liquidate maximizes his profit
by liquidating at this speed. Liquidating fast minimizes the costs of front-running by other traders.
7Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) focus on predation in product markets, and not in financial markets,
but their argument is general.
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In addition to the strategic traders, the market is populated by long-term investors.
The long-term traders are price-takers and have, at each point in time, an aggregate
demand of
Y (p) =
1
λ
(µ− p), (4)
depending on the current price p. This demand schedule by long-term traders is based
on two assumptions. First, it is downward sloping since in order to get long-term
traders to hold more of the risky asset, they must be compensated in terms of lower
prices. This could be because of risk aversion or because of institutional frictions
that make the risky asset less attractive for long-term traders. For instance, long-term
traders may be reluctant to buy complicated derivatives such as asset-backed securities.
(This institutional friction, of course, is what makes it profitable for strategic traders
to enter the market.) A downward sloping demand curve also arises in a price pressure
model a` la Grossman and Miller (1988) since the competitive but risk-averse market
maker sector is only willing to absorb the selling pressure at a lower price. Price
pressure implies a temporary price decline, and, similarly, in our model the price decline
vanishes at time T . Alternatively, if strategic traders have private information about
the fundamental value v, then the long-term traders face an adverse selection problem
that naturally leads to a downward sloping demand curve (Kyle (1985)). As in Kyle
(1985), λ measures the market liquidity of the risky asset.8
The second assumption underlying (4) is that long-term traders’ demand depends
only on the current price p. That is, they do not attempt to profit from price swings.
This behavior by the long-term investors is motivated by an assumption that they do
not have sufficient information, skills, or time to predict future price changes.
The trading mechanism works in the following way. The market clearing price p(t)
solves Y (p(t)) + X(t) = S, where X is the aggregate holding of the risky asset by
strategic traders,
X (t) =
I∑
i=1
xi (t) . (5)
Market clearing and (4) imply that the price is
p (t) = µ− λ (S −X (t)) . (6)
Hence, while in the “long term” at time T , the price is expected to be µ, in the
“medium term” the demand curve is downward sloping as described in (6). Further,
in a given instant, i.e., “in the very short term,” the strategic investors do not have
immediate access to the entire demand curve (6). As Longstaff (2001) documents,
8While the long-term traders have a downward sloping demand curve, we shall see that the strategic
traders’ actions tend to flatten the curve, except during crisis periods. Empirically, Shleifer (1986),
Chan and Lakonishok (1995), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) and others document downward sloping
demand curves, disputing Scholes (1972) who concludes that the demand curve is almost flat.
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in the real world one cannot trade infinitely fast in illiquid markets. To capture this
phenomenon, we assume that strategic traders can trade at most A ∈ R shares per
time unit at the current price p(t). Rather than simply assuming that orders beyond
A cannot be executed, we assume that traders suffer temporary impact costs if∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ai(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ > A . (7)
Orders are executed with equal priority in the sense that trader i incurs a cost of
G
(
ai (t) , a−i (t)
)
:= γ max
{
0, ai − a, a− ai}
where a−i (t) :=
(
a1 (t) , . . . , ai−1 (t) , ai+1 (t) , . . . , aI (t)
)
and where a = a (a−i (t)) and
a = a (a−i (t)) are, respectively, the unique solutions to
a +
∑
j,j 6=i
min
(
aj, a
)
= A;
a +
∑
j,j 6=i
max
(
aj, a
)
= A.
In words, a (a) is the highest intensity with which trader i can buy (sell) without
incurring the cost associated with a temporary price impact. Further, G is the product
of the per-share cost, γ, multiplied by the number of shares exceeding a or a. We
assume for simplicity that the temporary price impact is large, γ ≥ λIx¯.
There are several possible interpretations of this market structure. First, we can
think of a limit order book with a finite depth as follows: Each instant, long-term
traders submit A new buy-limit orders and A new sell-limit orders at the current price
level, while old limit orders are cancelled. This implies that the depth of the limit order
book is always a flow of Adt. Hence, as long as the strategic traders trade at a total
speed lower than A, their orders are absorbed by the limit order book, new limit orders
flow in, and the price walks up or down the demand curve (6). Orders that exceed A
cannot be executed. More generally, one could assume that such excess orders would
hit limit orders far away from the current price, suffering temporary impact costs in
line with our model.9
Alternatively, one could interpret the model as an over-the-counter market in which
it takes time to find counterparties. In order to trade, strategic traders must make time-
consuming phone calls to long-term traders. As each strategic trader goes through his
“rolodex” — his list of customer phone numbers ordered by reservation value — they
9Our interpretation of the limit order book implicitly assumes that new orders arrive close to the
current price, even if some trader hits limit orders far away from the current price. If new orders flow
in at the last execution price, then hitting orders far away from the current price becomes even more
costly as it permanently moves the price.
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walk along the demand curve.10 If strategic traders share the same customer base, they
face an aggregate speed constraint in line with our model. If traders’ customer bases
are distinct, the speed constraint is trader-specific.11
Importantly, our qualitative results do not depend on the specific assumptions of
the model; e.g. they also arise in a discrete time setting. The results rely on (i) that
strategic traders have limited capital, i.e., x¯ << ∞, (otherwise, the price is always
µ = E(v)), and (ii) that markets are illiquid in the sense that large trades move prices
(λ > 0), and traders avoid trading arbitrarily fast (A < ∞). The latter assumption is
relaxed in Section 7.2 in which all long-term traders participate in a batch auction and
orders of any size can be executed immediately.
Strategic trader i’s objective is to maximize his expected wealth subject to the
constraints described above. His wealth is the final value, xi(T )v, of his stock holdings
reduced by the cost, ai(t)p(t) + G, of buying the shares, where G is the temporary
impact cost. That is, a strategic trader’s objective is
max
ai( · )∈Ai
E
(
xi(T )v −
∫ T
0
[ai(t)p(t) + G
(
ai (t) , a−i (t)
)
]dt
)
, (8)
whereAi is the set of feasible trading processes, that is, the {F it}-adapted processes that
satisfy (2) and (3). The filtration {F it} represents trader i’s information. We assume
that each strategic trader learns the extent of his own temporary price impact and, at
time t0, he also knows which traders must liquidate. We consider both the case in which
the size of any distressed trader’s position is disclosed at t0 and the case in which it is
not. With no disclosure of positions, the filtration {F it} is generated by Id 1(t≥t0) and
G (ai (t) , a−i (t)); With disclosure of positions, the filtration is additionally generated
by xi(t0)1(t≥t0), i ∈ Id.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a set of feasible processes (a1, . . . , aI) such that, for
each i, ai ∈ Ai solves (8), taking a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aI) as given.
If investors could learn from the price, then they could essentially infer other traders’
actions since there is no “noise” in our model. Assuming that the strategic traders can
perfectly observe the actions of other strategic traders seems unrealistic and complicates
the game. Therefore, in Appendix B, we consider a more general economy with supply
uncertainty and show that, even though traders observe prices, they cannot infer other
traders’ actions. For ease of exposition, we analyze a setting with the same equilibrium
actions but which abstracts from supply uncertainty and simply consider a filtration
10If the strategic traders must contact the long-term traders in random order, the model needs to be
slightly adjusted, but would qualitatively be the same. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003) provide
a search framework for over-the-counter markets.
11Longstaff (2001) assumes that an agent must choose a limited trading intensity, that is,
∣∣ai(t)∣∣ ≤
constant . Making this assumption separately for each trader would not change our results qualitatively.
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{F it} that does not include the price. This means that a trader’s strategy depends
on whether he is in distress, how many other traders are in distress, the current time,
his own past trades, and the temporary impact costs he has incurred. We note that
the equilibrium in the main text is a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the more
general economy with supply uncertainty in which traders observe prices.12
3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we show how to solve a trader’s problem. For this, we rewrite trader
i’s problem (8) as a constant (which depends on x(0)) plus
E
(
λSxi(T )− 1
2
λ
[
xi (T )
]2 − ∫ T
0
[
λai (t) X−i (t) + G(ai (t) , a−i (t))
]
dt
)
, (9)
where we use E(v) = µ, the expression (6) for the price, the relation
∫ T
0
ai (t) xi (t) dt =
1
2
[
xi (t)2
]T
0
, and where we define
X−i (t) :=
∑
j=1,...,I, j 6=i
xj (t) . (10)
Under our standing assumptions, pt < E(v) at any time, and hence, any optimal
trading strategy satisfies xi(T ) = x¯ if trader i is not in distress. That is, the trader
ends up with the maximum capital in the arbitrage position. Furthermore, it is not
optimal to incur the temporary impact cost, that is, each trader optimally keeps his
trading intensity within his bounds a and a. These considerations imply that the
trader’s problem can be reduced to minimizing the third term in (9), which is useful
in solving a trader’s optimization problem and in deriving the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 If X−i ≥ 0, trader i’s problem can be written as
min
ai( · )∈Ai
E
(∫ T
0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt
)
(11)
s.t. xi(T ) = xi(0) +
∫ T
0
ai (t) dt = x¯ if i ∈ Ip
ai(t) ∈ [a (a−i (t)) , a (a−i (t))] .
12While our equilibrium definition is a standard Nash equilibrium, it can be verified that the trading
strategies derived below are the equilibrium actions of a sequential equilibrium, that is, the strategies
are “reasonable” even after out-of-equilibrium actions. This holds because, if one trader deviates from
his equilibrium strategy, the other traders do not observe this since the deviating trader does not
cause anyone else to incur impact costs.
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Note that a distressed trader i ∈ Id must have xi (T ) = 0 in order to have a feasible
strategy ai ∈ Ai that satisfies (3). The lemma shows that the trader’s problem is
to minimize
∫
ai (t) X−i (t) dt, that is, to minimize his trading cost, not taking into
account his own price impact. This is because the model is set up such that the trader
cannot make or lose money based on the way his own trades affect prices. (For example,
λ is assumed to be constant.) Rather, the trader makes money by exploiting the way
in which the other traders affect prices (through X−i). This distinguishes predatory
trading from price manipulation.
4 The Predatory Phase (t ∈ [t0, T ])
We first consider the “predatory phase,” that is, the period [t0, T ] in which some
strategic traders face financial distress. In Section 6, we analyze the full game including
the “investment phase” [0, t0) in which traders decide the size of their initial (arbitrage)
positions. We assume that each strategic large trader has a given position, x(t0) ∈ (0, x¯]
in the risky asset, at time t0. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that there is
“sufficient” time to trade, t0 + 2x¯I/A < T .
We proceed in two stages: In Section 4.1, certain traders are already in distress and
we analyze the behavior of the undistressed predators. Section 4.2 endogenizes agents’
distress and studies how predation and “panic” can lead to widespread crisis.
4.1 Exogenous Distress
Here, we take as given the set, Id, of distressed traders, and the common initial holding,
x(t0), of all strategic traders. A distressed trader j sells, in equilibrium, his shares at
constant speed aj = −A/I from t0 until t0 + x(t0)I/A, and thereafter aj = 0. This
behavior is optimal, as will be clear later. This liquidation strategy is known, in
equilibrium, by all the strategic traders.
The predators’ strategies are more interesting. We first consider the simplest case
in which there is a single predator, and subsequently we consider the case with multiple
competing predators.
4.1.1 Single Predator (Ip = 1)
In the case with a single predator, the strategic interaction is simple: the predator, say
i, is merely choosing his optimal trading strategy given the known liquidation strategy
of the distressed traders. Specifically, the distressed traders’ total position, X−i, is
decreasing to 0, and it is constant thereafter. Hence, using Lemma 1, we get the
following equilibrium.
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Proposition 1 With Ip = 1, the following describes an equilibrium:13 Each distressed
trader sells with constant speed A/I for τ = x(t0)
A/I
periods. The predator sells as fast
as he can without causing a temporary price impact for τ time periods, and then buys
back for x¯/A periods. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
A for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + τ + x¯A)
0 for t ≥ t0 + τ + x¯A .
(12)
The price overshoots; the price dynamics are
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λIx (t0) + λA [t− (t0 + τ)] for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + τ + x¯A)
µ + λ [x¯− S] for t ≥ t0 + τ + x¯A
(13)
where p (t0) = µ + λ (Ix (t0)− S).
We see that although the surviving strategic trader wants to end up with all his
capital invested in the arbitrage position (xi(T ) = x¯), he is selling as long as the
liquidating trader is selling. He is selling to profit from the price swings that occur
in the wake of the liquidation. The predatory trader would like to “front-run” the
distressed trader by selling before him and buying back shares after the distressed
trader has pushed down the price further. Since both traders can sell at the same
speed, the equilibrium is that they sell simultaneously and the predator buys back
in the end. (The case in which predators can sell earlier than distressed traders is
considered in Section 7.1.)
The selling by the predatory trader leads to price “overshooting.” The price falls
not only because the distressed trader is liquidating, but also because the predatory
trader is selling as well. After the distressed trader is done selling, the predatory trader
starts buying until he is at his capacity x¯, and this pushes the price up towards its new
equilibrium level.
The predatory trader is profiting from the distressed trader’s liquidation for two
reasons. First, the predator can sell his assets for an average price that is higher than
the price at which he can buy them back after the distressed trader has left the market.
Second, the predator can buy additional units cheaply until he reaches his capacity.
Since the price of the predator’s existing position x(t0) goes down, however, the preda-
tor may appear to be losing money on a mark-to-market basis as the liquidation takes
place. In the real world, this mark-to-market loss could further entice the predator’s
selling.
13The predator’s profit does not depend on how fast he buys back his shares as long as he does not
incur temporary impact costs and he ends fully invested. Hence, there are other equilibria in which
the predator buys back at a slower rate. These equilibria are, however, qualitatively the same as the
one stated in the proposition, and there are no other equilibria than these ones.
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The predatory behavior by the surviving agent makes liquidation excessively costly
for the distressed agent. To see this, suppose a trader estimates the liquidity in “normal
times,” that is, when no trader is in distress. The liquidity — as defined by the price
sensitivity to demand changes — is given by λ in Equation (6). When liquidity is
needed by the distressed trader, however, the liquidity is lower due to the fact that the
market becomes “one-sided” since the predator is selling as well. Specifically, the price
moves by Iλ for each unit the distressed trader is selling.
The distressed trader’s excess liquidation cost equals the predator’s profit from
preying. Note that the predator does not exploit the group of long-term investors. The
price overshooting implies that long-term investors are buying and selling shares at the
same price. Hence, it does not matter for the group of long-term investors whether the
predator preys or not.14
Numerical Example. We illustrate this predatory behavior with a numerical ex-
ample. The supply of risky assets is S = 40 and there are I = 2 strategic traders,
each of whom has a capacity of x¯ = 10 shares. At time t0 = 5, each trader has a
position of x(t0) = 8 and I
d = 1 trader becomes distressed while the other trader acts
as a predator. At time T = 7 the asset is liquidated with expected value µ = 140 (or,
equivalently, the market becomes perfectly liquid). Before that time, the price liquid-
ity factor is λ = 1 and A = 20 shares can be traded per time unit without temporary
impact costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the holdings of the distressed trader: This trader starts liqui-
dating his position of 8 shares at time t0 = 5 with a trading intensity of A/2 = 10
shares per time unit. He is done liquidating at time 5.8. At time 5, the predator knows
that this liquidation will take place, and, further, he realizes that the price will drop in
response. Hence, he wants to sell high and buy back low. The predator optimally sells
all his 8 shares simultaneously with the distressed trader’s liquidation, and, thereafter,
he buys back x¯ = 10 shares as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the price dynamics. The price is falling from time 5 to time 5.8
when both strategic traders are selling. Since 16 shares are sold and λ = 1, the price
drops 16 points, falling to 100. As the predator re-builds his position from time 5.8 to
time 6.3, the price recovers to 110. Hence, there is a price overshooting of 10 points.
It is intriguing that the predator is selling even when the price is below its long-run
level 110. This behavior is optimal because, as long as the distressed trader is selling,
the price will drop further and the predator can profit from selling additional shares
and later repurchasing them. To further explain this point, we consider the predator’s
profit if he sells one share less. In this case, the predator sells 7 shares from time 5
to time 5.7, waits for the distressed trader to finish selling at time 5.8, and then buys
14Recall that even though long-term investors could profit from using a predatory strategy them-
selves, we assume that they do not have sufficient information or skills to do that.
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9 shares from time 5.8 to time 6.25. The price dynamics in this case are illustrated
by the dotted line in Figure 4. We see that the 9 shares are bought back at the same
prices as the last 9 shares were bought in the case where the predator continues to sell
as long as the distressed trader does. Hence, to compare the profit in the two cases,
we focus on the price at which the 10th (and last) share is sold and bought back. This
share is sold at prices between 102 and 100, that is, with an average price of 101. It
is bought back for prices between 100 and 101, that is, for an average price of 100.50.
Hence, this “extra” trade is profitable, earning a profit of 101-100.50=0.50.
Figure 1: Holdings of distressed trader Figure 2: Holdings of predator
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Figure 3: Price dynamics
Figure 4: Price dynamics if predator
sells 1 share less
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4.1.2 Multiple Predators (Ip ≥ 2)
We saw in the previous example how a single predatory trader has an incentive to
“front-run” the distressed trader by selling as long as the distressed trader is selling.
With multiple surviving traders this incentive remains, but another effect is introduced:
These predators want to end up with all their capital in the arbitrage position and they
want to buy their shares sooner than the other strategic traders do.
The proposition below shows that, in equilibrium, predators trade off these incen-
tives by selling for awhile and then start buying back before the distressed traders have
finished their liquidation.
Proposition 2 In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯,
each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I for x(t0)
A/I
periods. Each predator
sells at trading intensity A/I for τ :=
x(t0)−
Ip−1
I−1
x¯
A/I
periods and buys back shares at a
trading intensity of AI
d
I(Ip−1)
until t0 +
x(t0)
A/I
. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
AId
I(Ip−1)
for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
0 for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I .
(14)
The price overshoots; the price dynamics are
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λAτ + λ AIdI(Ip−1) [t− (t0 + τ)] for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
µ + λ [x¯Ip − S] for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I ,
(15)
where p (t0) = µ + λIx (t0)− λS.
The proposition shows that price overshooting also occurs in the case of multiple
predators if x(t0) is large relative to x¯.
15 This is because the predators strategically
sell excessively at first, and start buying relatively late.
15We assume that all strategic traders’ positions at t0 are the same, i.e., x
i(t0) = x(t0)∀i. The
analysis extends to a setting where strategic traders hold different positions at t0. In such a setting,
the equilibrium strategies are described as follows: Initially, all predators and distressed sellers sell
at full speed A
I
. Hence, each trader’s X−i is declining. When X−i(t) = X−i(T ) = x¯(Ip − 1) for
the strategic trader with the smallest initial position xi(t0), all predators start repurchasing shares
at a speed of I−I
p
I[Ip−1]A. Note that this speed guarantees that each predator’s X
−i is flat. When the
predator with the highest x(t0) reaches his final holding x¯, he stops buying shares and the remaining
predators increase their trading intensity to I
c
I[(Ip−1)−1]A. Similarly, as predators complete their
repurchases, the remaining predators adjust their trading speed to I
c
I[Iremaining−1]A. Interestingly, for
fixed aggregate holdings of all predators at t0, the price overshooting increases with the dispersion of
the initial holdings. To see this, note that the length of the initial selling spree is determined by the
predator with the smallest initial position xi(t0), whose X
−i(t0) is the highest.
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It is instructive to consider why it cannot be an equilibrium that there is no price
overshooting and predators start buying back already at time t′ < t0 + τ when the
price reaches its long-run level. To see that, suppose all predators buy back at time t′.
Then, if a single predator deviated and postponed buying, the price would continue to
fall after t′. Hence, this deviating predator could buy back his position cheaper after
other traders have completed their liquidations, and hence, increase his profit.
The equilibrium has the property that, from each predator’s perspective, X−i (t)
(the total asset holding of other traders) is declining until t0 + τ and is constant
thereafter. Since predator i also sells until t0 + τ , aggregate stock holdings X (t) and
the price overshoot.
The price overshooting is lower if there are more predators since more predators
behave more competitively:
Proposition 3 Keep constant the fraction, Ip/I, of predators, the total arbitrage ca-
pacity, Ix¯, and the total initial stock holding, Ix (t0), and assume that Ix(t0) ≥ Ipx¯.
Then, the price overshooting
(i) is strictly positive for all nonzero Ip < ∞;
(ii) is decreasing in the number of predators Ip; and
(iii) approaches 0 as Ip approaches infinity.
Numerical Example. We consider the cases with a total number of traders I = 3,
9, and 27. For each case, we assume that a third of the traders are in distress, that is,
Id/I = 1/3. As in the previous example, we let λ = 1, µ = 140, S = 40, t0 = 5, T = 7,
the total trading speed is A = 20, the total initial holding is x(t0) · I = 16, and the
total trader holding capacity is x¯ · I = 20. Figure 5 illustrates the asset holdings of
predators and Figure 6 shows the price dynamics.
We see that there is a substantial price overshooting when the number of predators
is small, and that the overshooting is decreasing as the number of predators increases.
With more predators, the competitive pressure to buy shares early is larger. Hence,
the liquidation cost for a distressed trader is decreasing in the number of predators
(even holding the total trading capacity fixed).
Collusion. The predators can profit from collusion. In particular, they could in-
crease their revenue from predation by selling until the troubled traders were finished
liquidating and only then start rebuilding their positions. Hence, through collusion,
the predators could jointly act like a single predator (with the slight modification that
multiple predators have more capital). Collusive and non-collusive outcomes are quali-
tatively different. A collusive outcome is characterized by predators buying shares only
after the troubled traders have left the market and by a large price overshooting. In
contrast, a non-collusive outcome is characterized by predators buying all the shares
16
Figure 5: Holdings, xi(t), of each predator Figure 6: Price dynamics
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they need by the time the troubled traders have finished liquidating and by a relatively
smaller price overshooting.
Collusion could potentially occur through an explicit arranged agreement or im-
plicitly without arrangement, called “tacit” collusion. Tacit collusion means that the
collusive outcome is the equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In our model, tacit
collusion cannot occur. However, if strategic traders could observe (or infer) each oth-
ers’ trading activity, then tacit collusion might arise because predators could “punish”
a predator that deviates from the collusive strategy.16
Large amounts of sidelined capacity, x¯− x(t0). Proposition 2 states that preda-
tory trading and the overshooting occur as long as traders’ initial holding is large
enough relative to their position limit, that is, x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯. Proposition 2’ analyzes
the complementary case in which x(t0) <
Ip−1
I−1
x¯, that is, the capacity on the sideline
is large relative to the selling of the distressed traders. Since the amount of available
(sidelined) capacity is large, the competitive pressure among undistressed traders to
buy shares overwhelms the incentive to front-run, and therefore there is no predatory
trading. Instead, undistressed traders start buying immediately.
Proposition 2’ In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x (t0) < Ip−1I−1 x¯,
each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I. Each predator buys initially at the
16If traders could observe each others’ trades, then we would have to change our definition of
strategies and equilibrium accordingly. A rigorous analysis of such a model is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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high trading intensity of
A(I+Id)
IP I
for τ := − (I−1)x(t0)−(Ip−1)x¯
A
(
1− I+I
d
IpI
) periods and goes on buying
at the lower trading intensity of AI
d
I(Ip−1)
until t0 +
x(t0)
A/I
. The price is weakly increasing.
In Section 6, we study the equilibrium determination of x(t0) and show that x(t0)
is so large that predatory trading happens with positive probability (i.e., the premises
of Proposition 2’ are violated with positive probability).
4.2 Endogenous Distress, Systemic Risk and Risk Manage-
ment
So far, we have assumed that certain strategic traders fall into financial distress, without
specifying the underlying cause. In this section, we endogenize distress and study how
predatory activity can lead to contagious default events. We assume that a trader
must liquidate if his wealth drops to a threshold level W . This is because of margin
constraints, risk management, or other considerations in connection with low wealth.
Trader i’s wealth at t consists of his position, xi (t), of the asset that our analysis
focuses on, as well as wealth held in other assets Oi (t). That is, his mark-to-market
wealth is W i (t) = xi (t) p (t) + Oi (t). The value of the other holdings Oi (t) is subject
to an exogenous shock at time t0, which can be observed by all traders. At other times,
Oi (t) is constant.
Obviously, if the wealth shock ∆Oi at t0 is so large that W
i (t0) ≤ W , the trader is
immediately in distress and must liquidate. Smaller negative shocks with W i (t0) > W
can, however, also lead to an “endogenous distress,” since the potential selling behavior
of predators and other distressed traders may erode the wealth of trader i even further.
A trader who knows that he must liquidate in the future finds it optimal to start selling
already at time t0 because he foresees the price decline caused by the selling pressure
of other strategic traders. As in the previous sections, we can consider the set Id
of liquidating traders. Interestingly, whether an agent anticipates having to liquidate
depends on the number of other agents who are expected to be in distress.
We let W
(
Id
)
be the maximum wealth at t0 such that trader i cannot avoid financial
distress if Id traders are expected to be in distress. More precisely, for Id > 0, it is the
maximum initial wealth W i(t0) such that
max
ai∈Ai
min
t∈[t0,T ]
W i(t, ai, a−i) ≤ W
where a−i has
(
Id − 1) strategies of liquidating and I − Id strategies of preying in a
time period of τ(Id). Further, for Id = 0, W (0) = W . To understand this definition,
suppose trader i expects that Id − 1 other traders will be in distress with resulting
selling pressure. Further, he expects that I − Id other traders will act as predators,
preying with a vigor that corresponds to Id defaults. That is, the predators sell in
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anticipation of all of the defaults including trader i’s own default. If, under these
circumstances, trader i will sooner or later be in default no matter what he does, then
his wealth is less than W (Id).
With this definition of W (Id), it follows directly that — in an equilibrium17 in which
Id traders immediately liquidate and Ip = I − Id traders prey as in Propositions 1,
2 and 2’ — every distressed trader i ∈ Id has wealth W i(t0) ≤ W (Id), and every
predator i ∈ Ip has W i(t0) > W (Id).
Interestingly, the higher is the expected number, Id, of distressed traders, the higher
is the “survival hurdle” W (Id).
Proposition 4 The more traders are expected to be in distress, the harder it is to
survive. That is, W (Id) is increasing in Id.
This insight follows from two facts: First, even without predatory trading, a higher
number of distressed traders leads to more sell-offs and a larger price decline thereby
eroding each trader’s wealth. Second, a higher number of distressed traders also makes
predation more fierce since there are fewer competing predators and more prey to
exploit. This fierce predation lowers the price even further, making survival more
difficult.
Proposition 4 is useful in understanding systemic risk. Financial regulators are
concerned that the financial difficulty of one or two large traders can drag down many
more investors, thereby destabilizing the financial sector. Our framework helps ex-
plain why this spillover effect occurs. To see this, consider the economy depicted in
Figure 7. Trader A’s wealth is in the range of (W (1) ,W (2)], trader B’s wealth is in
(W (2) ,W (3)], and trader C’s is in (W (3) ,W (4)]. The three remaining traders (D,
E, and F) have enough reserves to fight off any crisis, that is, their wealth is above
W (I).
With these wealth levels, the unique equilibrium is such that no strategic trader is
in distress and all of them immediately start increasing their position from x (t0) to x¯.
To see this, note first that it cannot be an equilibrium that one agent defaults. If one
agent is expected to default, no one defaults because no one has wealth below W (1).
Similarly, it is not an equilibrium that two traders default, because only trader A has
wealth below W (2), and so on.
On the other hand, if trader D faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W
D (t0) < W ,
he can drag down traders A, B, and C, as shown in Figure 8. If it is expected that four
traders will be in distress, then traders A, B, C, and D will liquidate their position since
their wealth is below W (4). Intuitively, the fact that trader D is forced to liquidate his
position encourages predation and the price is depressed. This, in turn, brings three
17There may be other kinds of equilibria in which a surviving trader does not prey because of fear
of driving himself in distress. For ease of exposition, we do not consider these equilibria. Equilibria
of the form that we consider exist under certain conditions on the initial holdings and wealths.
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Figure 7: No trader is in distress. Figure 8: One trader drags three down.
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
EE FD F
other traders into financial difficulty. This situation captures the notion of systemic
risk. The financial difficulty of one trader endangers the financial stability of three
other traders.
In the economy of Figure 8, there are also other equilibria in which 1, 2, or 3 traders
face distress. For instance, it is an equilibrium that only trader D liquidates, since if
everybody expects that only trader D will go under, traders A, B, C, E, and F prey only
briefly and buy back after a short while. The predation is less fierce in this equilibrium
in the sense that predators start re-purchasing shares earlier (i.e., turning point, t0 +τ ,
occurs earlier).
In the case of multiple equilibria, interesting coordination issues arise: A widespread
crisis can be caused by coordinated selling by predators or by “panic” selling by vul-
nerable traders. For example, it could be that neither trader E nor trader F alone can
cause trader A’s distress, but the joint selling of E and F will push the price sufficiently
down to drive A into financial distress.
Alternatively, suppose C expects A and B to be selling along with aggressive trading
by predators, then C will sell himself, and this panic selling by C will in turn warrant
the selling by A and B. Alternatively, if A, B, and C could coordinate on not panicking,
then selling is not warranted and the widespread crisis will be avoided.
We note that the multiplicity in our example does not arise when trader E also
faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W
E (t0) < W (1). In this case, at least two traders
must liquidate, which drives A in default since A has wealth less than W (2). Hence,
at least three traders must liquidate, which makes predation yet fiercer and drives B
in default. Similarly, this results in C’s default, and we see that the “ripple-effect”
equilibrium is unique in this case.
The dangers of systemic risk in financial markets provide an argument for inter-
vention by regulatory bodies, such as central banks. A bailout of one or two traders
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or even only a coordination effort can stabilize prices and ensure the survival of nu-
merous other vulnerable traders. However, it also spoils the profit opportunity for the
remaining predators who would otherwise benefit from the financial crisis. From an
ex-ante perspective, the anticipation of crisis preventive action by the central bank
reduces the systemic risk of the financial sector, and hence, traders are more willing
to exploit arbitrage opportunities. This reduces initial mispricings, but it could also
worsen agency problems not considered here.
In light of our model, the 1987 crash can be viewed as an example of predatory
trading enhancing systemic risk. The Brady Report (Brady et al. (1988)) argues that
an initial price decline triggered price insensitive selling by institutions that followed
portfolio insurance trading strategies. This encouraged aggressive trading-oriented
institutions to sell. That is, they preyed on portfolio insurance traders. Less informed
long-term traders did not step in to provide liquidity since they underestimated the
amount of uninformed trading — portfolio insurance trading and predatory trading —
and interpreted it as informed selling. The latter point is emphasized by Grossman
(1988) and Gennotte and Leland (1990).
Risk Management. The 1987 crash also illustrates the danger of using a rigid risk
management strategy, which is known to other strategic traders. It is preferable to
keep the risk management strategy confidential and sufficiently flexible.
Further, the less liquid the security is (i.e., the higher λ), the larger is the price
decline due to predatory trading and the associated wealth deterioration. Formally,
this means that W (Id) is increasing in λ. Consequently, a fund with illiquid assets
must have a careful risk management strategy. Further, since illiquidity exacerbates
systemic risk, the risk management strategy should also take into account other traders’
exposure and financial soundness.
Also, the risk management strategy should take into account that asset correla-
tions can be different during a liquidity crisis because price movements are caused by
distressed selling and predatory trading rather than fundamental news. Suppose, for
example, that the risky asset represents a long-short position in securities with identical
cashflows. These securities will move together in normal times, but during a liquidity
crisis their prices can depart as represented by p(t) declining in our model. Hence,
a seemingly perfect hedge based on fundamentals can cause losses during a crisis as
the mispricing widens, forcing a trader to liquidate at the least favorable terms. Risk
managers should be aware that the past empirical correlation structure might ignore
possible predatory trading attacks and separate stress tests are needed to account for
predation risk.
A fund’s wealth might not only suffer from selling illiquid assets, but also from fund
outflows. The risk of fund outflows effectively increase the fund’s ultimate survival
threshold W and make it even more vulnerable to predatory trading. Hence, open-end
funds are more subject to predatory trading than closed-end funds and, consequently,
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should hold more liquid assets.
Furthermore, traders who hold illiquid assets might be unable to seek outside fi-
nancing to bridge temporary liquidity needs. This is because the trader may have
to reveal his position and trading strategy to possible creditors, such as the trader’s
brokers, exposing him to predatory trading.
Finally, risk management should take into account the way in which assets are
marked-to-market. Suppose, for instance, that a position is financed by collateralized
loan by a broker, who can sell the asset if margin requirements are not met. Then, the
broker has some discretion in setting the price used to mark the position to market if
the market is highly illiquid. Hence, the broker can enhance the trader’s problems by
marking-to-market aggressively and forcing a fire-sale of the illiquid asset, depressing
the price and causing losses for the distressed trader. The broker may have an incentive
to do this in order to be able to sell the collateral early.18 An illustrative example is the
case of Granite Partners (Askin Capital Management), who held very illiquid fixed-
income securities. Its main brokers — Merrill Lynch, DLJ and others — gave the
fund less than 24 hours to meet a margin call. Merrill Lynch and DLJ then allegedly
sold off collateral assets at below market prices at an insider-only auction where bids
were solicited from a restricted number of other brokers excluding retail institutional
investors.
Extensions. In our perfect information setting, all traders know, the instant after t0,
how the equilibrium will play out. That is, they know the entire future price path as
well as the number of predators Ip and victims Id. In a more complex setting in which
traders’ wealth shocks are not perfectly observable and the price process is noisy, this
need not be the case. A trader might start selling shares not knowing when the price
decline stops. He might expect to act as a predator but may actually end up as prey.
Finally, while in our equilibrium all vulnerable traders start liquidating their posi-
tion from t0 onwards, one sometimes observes that these traders miss the opportunity
to reduce their position early. This exacerbates the predation problem, since a delayed
reaction on the part of the distressed traders allows the predators to front-run as dis-
cussed in Section 7.1. The phenomenon of delayed reaction by vulnerable traders may
be explained in an enriched version of our framework. First, if prices are fluctuating,
the trader might “gamble for resurrection” by not selling early, in the hope that a
positive price shock will liberate him from financial distress. Second, if selling activity
cannot be kept secret, a desire to appear solvent might prevent a troubled trader from
selling early.
18Futures exchanges can also induce predatory trading by imposing tighter margin constraints.
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5 Valuation with Endogenous Liquidity
Predatory trading has implications for valuation of large positions. We consider three
levels of valuation with increasing emphasis on the position’s liquidity:
Definition 2 (i) The “paper value” of a position x at time t is V paper (t, x) = xp(t);
(ii) the “orderly liquidation value” is V orderly (t, x) = x
[
p (t)− 1
2
λx
]
; and
(iii) the “distressed liquidation value”, V distressed (t, x, Ip), is the revenue raised in equi-
librium when Ip predators are preying.
The paper value is the simple mark-to-market value of the position. The orderly
liquidation value is the revenue raised in a secret liquidation, taking into account the
fact that the demand curve is downward sloping. The downward sloping demand curve
implies that liquidation makes the price drop by λx, resulting in an average liquidation
price of p (t)− 1
2
λx.
The distressed liquidation value takes into account not only the downward sloping
demand curve, but also the strategic interaction between traders and, specifically, the
costs of predation. We note that V distressed depends on the characteristics of the market
such as the number of predators, the number of troubled traders, and their initial
holdings. For instance, the distressed valuation of a position declines if other traders
also face financial difficulty.
Clearly, the orderly liquidation value is lower than the paper value. The distressed
liquidation value is even lower if the predators have initially large positions.
Proposition 5 If x(t0) ≥
√
Ip(Ip−1)
I−1
x¯, then
V paper(x(t0)) > V
orderly(x(t0)) > V
distressed(x(t0)) .
The low distressed liquidation value is a consequence of predation. In particular,
predation causes the price to initially drop much faster than what is warranted by the
distressed trader’s own sales. Hence, the market is endogenously more illiquid when a
distressed trader needs liquidity the most.
Consider a strategic trader estimating the liquidity of the market in “normal” times.
This liquidity estimate leads to an estimate of the liquidation value of V orderly. The
actual liquidation value in the case of distress, however, can be much lower.
It is interesting to consider what happens as the number of predators grows, keeping
constant their total size. More predators implies that their behavior is more similar
to that of a price-taking agent. This more competitive behavior makes predation less
fierce, reduces the price overshooting, and increases the distressed liquidation value.
As the number of predators grow, the price overshooting disappears (Proposition 3).
Importantly, even in the limit with infinitely many predators, the distressed liquidation
value is strictly lower than the orderly liquidation value. This is because predatory
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trading makes the price drop faster, than without predatory trading, implying that the
distressed traders sell most of their shares at the low price.
Proposition 6 Keep constant the fraction, Ip/I, of predators, the total arbitrage cap-
ital, Ix¯, and the total initial holding, Ix(t0), and suppose that x(t0) ≥ x¯
√
Ip/I. Then,
the total distressed liquidation value, IdV distressed, is increasing in the number of preda-
tors, Ip. In the limit as Ip approaches infinity, the total distressed liquidation revenue
remains strictly smaller than the total orderly liquidation value,
limIp→∞ I
dV distressed (x (t0)) < V
orderly
(
Idx(t0)
)
.
If the predators’ initial position x(t0) is low relative to their capacity x¯, then the
distressed liquidation value can be greater than the orderly liquidation value. This
is because the announcement of a distressed liquidation will, in this case, cause the
other traders to compete for the shares and immediately start buying (Proposition 2’).
Hence, announcing an intension to sell — called sunshine trading — is profitable if there
is enough available capacity on the sideline among relevant investors, but otherwise it
will cause predatory trading.
6 The Investment Phase (t ∈ [0, t0])
So far, we have taken as given the position, x(t0), that strategic traders want to acquire
prior to t0. Here, we endogenize x (t0) and thereby determine the capacity x¯ − x(t0)
that traders leave on the sideline to reduce their risk exposure or to be able to exploit
cheap buying opportunities that may arise later. We show that the sidelined capacity
in equilibrium is so small that predatory trading has to occur with strictly positive
probability, and we study how x(t0) depends on disclosure policies.
For simplicity, we assume that with probability pi, a randomly chosen trader is
in distress (Id = 1), and with probability 1 − pi, no trader is in distress (Id = 0).
Note that this implies that the risk of distress is exogenous and independent of the
position size. The strategic traders’ initial position at time 0 — when they learn of
the arbitrage opportunity — is assumed to be zero. To separate the investment phase
from the predatory phase, we assume that the time, t0, of possible financial distress is
sufficiently late, that is, t0 >
x¯
A/I
.
Proposition 7 describes the initial trading by large strategic investors.
Proposition 7 First, all traders buy at the rate A/I until they have accumulated a
position of x(t0). If I > 2 and a distressed trader’s position is not disclosed, then
x (t0) =
(
1− pi
I
)
x¯.
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If I = 2 or if a distressed trader’s position is disclosed, then
x (t0) =
(
1− pi
I − 1
)
x¯.
If a trader is distressed at t0, then x(t0) is so large — with or without disclosure — that
the remaining strategic traders use the predatory strategies described in Propositions 1
and 2. If no one is in distress at t0, then all traders buy at the rate A/I until they
reach their capacity x¯.
All traders have an initial desire to buy their preferred position x (t0) without any
delay since the acquisitions by other traders increase the price. Importantly, it is this
desire of the traders to quickly acquire a large position that later leaves them vulnerable
to predation.
The optimal position x(t0) balances the costs and benefits associated with the three
possible outcomes after t0: (i) no trader faces distress, (ii) another trader faces distress,
and (iii) the trader himself faces distress. In case (i) in which no trader faces distress,
all traders immediately start buying additional shares and the price increases after t0.
In the other two cases, the behavior of the surviving strategic traders depends on the
position size x(t0). For x(t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯ they sell and prey on the distressed trader as
described in Propositions 1 and 2, while for x(t0) <
Ip−1
I−1
x¯ they buy assets and provide
liquidity as outlined in Proposition 2’.
Proposition 7 shows that x(t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, which implies that predatory trading is an
inherent part of equilibrium. To see why, suppose to the contrary that x(t0) is so small
that there is always enough available capital to absorb a distressed trader’s position as
described in Proposition 2’. Then, the price increases after t0 not only in case (i), but
also if a trader is in distress as in (ii) and (iii). Therefore, in all three cases, a trader
would profit from having built up a larger position prior to t0, and this is inconsistent
with equilibrium.
In fact, it is a general result, beyond our specific assumptions, that in any equilib-
rium predatory trading occurs with positive probability. The general argument is that
keeping capacity on the sideline has opportunity costs, which must be offset by prof-
its earned during a crisis with capital shortage. Hence, such a “liquidity crisis” must
happen with positive probability and predatory trading is profitable during a liquidity
crisis.
Further, Proposition 7 determines x(t0) exactly and shows how it depends on the
granularity of disclosure. If agents anticipate that their position will be disclosed when
in distress, then they choose smaller initial positions, that is, (1 − pi
I−1
)x¯ < (1 − pi
I
)x¯.
This is because disclosure makes it more costly to liquidate a larger position because
predators will prey more fiercely (i.e., start buying at a later time τ).
The link between disclosure and predation risk is relevant more generally, that is,
even if disclosure is not tied directly to the distress event. Enforcing strict disclosure
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rules concerning a fund’s security positions or risk management strategy can increase
the fund’s exposure to predation risk. This helps explain the secrecy of large hedge
funds and why they deal with multiple brokers and banks to reduce the amount of
sensitive information known by each counterparty. Consistently, IAFE Investor Risk
Committee (IRC) (2001) emphasizes hedge funds’ risk of disclosure due to predatory
trading and favors less stringent disclosure rules for large funds. The risk of predation
is reduced if the disclosure pertains only to portfolio characteristics and not to specific
positions, or if the disclosure is delayed in time.
Also, our analysis suggests that any disclosed information should be dispersed as
broadly as possible in order to minimize the implications of predatory trading since,
with more strategic traders, predation is less fierce. Also, a public disclosure could
be helpful if it could attract liquidity from long-term traders by creating attention
and convincing them that a selling pressure was due to distress, not due to adverse
information about the security. While this is outside our model, attracting long-term
traders might flatten their demand curve (i.e., lower λ).
7 Further Implications of Predatory Trading
7.1 Front-running
So far, we have considered equilibria in which the distressed traders sell at the same
time as the predators. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases, the predators
are selling before the distressed trader. That is, the predators are truly front-running.
There are various potential reasons for the delayed selling by the distressed traders.
They might hope that they will face a positive wealth shock that will allow them
to overcome the financial difficulty and avoid liquidation costs. Alternatively, the
distressed trader may not be aware that the predator — for instance, the trader’s own
investment bank — is preying on him. Finally, the predators could simply have an
ability to trade faster. In any case, front-running makes predation even more profitable.
The equilibrium with a single predator is simple: First, the predator sells as much
as possible. Then, he waits for the distressed trader to depress the price by liquidat-
ing his position, and finally the predator repurchases his position. Clearly, the price
overshoots, and the predation makes liquidation costly.
The equilibrium with many predators can also easily be analyzed within our frame-
work. Suppose that, at time t0, it is clear that I
d traders are in financial distress, and
that these traders start selling at time t1, where t1 > t0 +
IdIp
A(Ip−1)
x.
The predatory trading plays out as follows. First, the predators front-run by selling.
This leads to a large price drop. When the distressed traders start selling, the predators
are buying back, and the price recovers to its new equilibrium level.
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Proposition 8 In the unique symmetric equilibrium with Ip ≥ 2 and x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯,
each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I for x(t0)
A/I
periods starting at time
t1. Each predator starts selling from t0 onwards at trading intensity A/I
p for τ :=
(I−1)x(t0)−x¯(Ip−1)
A(Ip−1)/Ip
periods and buys back shares at a trading intensity of A
I
Id
Ip−1
from t1
onwards. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/Ip for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
0 for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t1)
AId
I(Ip−1)
for t ∈ [t1, t1 + x(t0)A/I )
0 for t ≥ t1 + x(t0)A/I .
(16)
The price overshoots; the price dynamics are
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λAτ for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t1)
p (t0)− λAτ + λAI I
d
Ip−1
[t− t1] for t ∈ [t1, t1 + x(t0)A/I )
µ + λ [x¯Ip − S] for t ≥ t1 + x(t0)A/I ,
(17)
where p (t0) = µ + λIx (t0) − λS. The ability to front-run by predators implies larger
liquidation costs for distressed traders and greater price overshooting.
Changes in the composition of main stock indices force index funds to re-balance
their portfolios to minimize their tracking errors. While prior to 1989 changes in the
composition of S&P occurred without prior notice, from 1989 onwards they were an-
nounced one week in advance. The price dynamics during these intermediate weeks sug-
gest that index tracking funds re-balance their portfolio around the inclusion/deletion
date, while strategic traders front-run by trading immediately after the announcement.
In particular, Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) documents a sharp price rise (drop) on the
announcement day, a continued rise (decline) until the actual inclusion (deletion), and
a partial price reversal on the days following the inclusion (deletion). Hence, consistent
with our model’s predictions, there appears to be front-running and price overshoot-
ing. If index tracking funds start re-balancing their portfolio at the time of the index
inclusion, then our model replicates exactly the documented stylized price pattern.
However, high observed trading volume on the day prior to the inclusions (deletion)
indicates that many of the index funds trade already prior to this day. If so, our model
would predict that the price reversal occurs the day before inclusion (deletion) unless
there is a monopolist strategic trader or traders collude. We note that the observed
persistence of price overshooting might partially be due to price pressure in the spirit
of Grossman and Miller (1988) although simple price pressure would not explain the
price adjustment and large trading volume around the announcement (which, in our
model, are caused by front-running).
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7.2 Batch Auction Markets, Trading Halts, Circuit Breakers
In this subsection, we study how certain market practices can alleviate the problem of
predatory trading. We consider a setting in which trading is halted, all of the long-term
traders are contacted, and all traders — strategic and long-term — can participate
in a batch auction. Hence, while shares are traded continuously outside the batch
auction, blocks can be sold in the auction. We assume that long-term traders provide
a continuum of limit orders, distressed traders submit market orders for their entire
holdings, and predators submit market orders to maximize profit. After all orders are
collected, they are executed at a single price in the auction, and, thereafter, sequential
trading resumes as described previously in the paper. Real-world trading halts and
circuit breakers work essentially in this way.
Proposition 9 describes the equilibrium behavior of the predators and the price
dynamics for this setting.
Proposition 9 With x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, each predator submits a buy order of size I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)]
at the batch auction at t0. Thereafter, each predator buys at a trading intensity of A/I
p
for [x− x (t0)] /A periods.
The price dynamics are
p∗ (t) =


µ− λS + λ (Ip − 1) x + λx (t0) at the batch auction at t0
µ− λS + λ (Ip − 1) x + λx (t0) + λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + x−x(t0)A )
µ− λS + λIpx¯ for t ≥ t0 + x−x(t0)A .
(18)
The price overshooting is smaller compared to the setting without batch auction.
In contrast to the sequential market structure, predators do not sell shares. This is
because the batch auction prevents predators from walking down the demand curve.
Predators are still reluctant to provide liquidity, however, as long as competitive forces
are weak. To see this, note that a single predator does not participate in the batch
auction at all, while in the case of multiple predators each individual predator’s order
size is limited to I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)]. This explains why some price overshooting remains.
After the batch auction, the surviving predators build up their final position x (T ) = x
as fast as possible in continuous trading. Hence, the price gradually increases until
it reaches the same long-run level p (T ) = µ − λS + λIpx¯. In summary, the price
overshooting is substantially lower compared to the sequential trading mechanism and
the new long-run equilibrium price is reached more quickly.
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7.3 Bear Raids and the Up-tick Rule
A bear raid is a special form of predatory trading, which was not uncommon prior to
1933 according to Eiteman, Dice, and Eiteman (1966).19 A ring of traders identifies
and sells short a stock that other investors hold long on their margin accounts. This
depresses the stock’s price and triggers margin calls for the long investors, who are then
forced to sell their shares, further deflating the price. Based on his (allegedly first-hand)
knowledge of these practices, Joe Kennedy, the first head of the SEC, introduced the
so-called up-tick rule to prevent bear raids. This rule bans short-sales during a falling
market. In the context of our model, this means that strategic traders with small
initial positions, x(t0), cannot undertake predatory trading. This reduces the price
overshooting and increases the distressed traders’ liquidation revenue.
7.4 Contagion
Predatory trading suggests a novel mechanism for financial contagion. Suppose that the
strategic traders have large positions in several markets. Further, suppose that a large
strategic trader incurs a loss in one market, bringing this trader in financial trouble.
Then, this large trader must downsize his operations and reduce all his positions. Kyle
and Xiong (2001) model this direct contagion result due to a wealth effect. Our model
shows that predatory trading by other traders amplifies contagion and the price impact
in all affected markets.
This amplification is not driven by a correlation in economic fundamentals or by
information spillovers but, rather, by the composition of the holdings of large traders
who must significantly reduce their positions. This insight has the following empirical
implication: A shock to one security, which is held by large vulnerable traders, may be
contagious to other securities that are also held by the vulnerable traders.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides a new framework for studying the phenomenon of predatory trad-
ing. Predatory trading is important in connection with large security trades in illiquid
markets. We show that predatory trading leads to price overshooting and amplifies a
large trader’s liquidation cost and default risk. Hence, the risk management strategy of
large traders should account for “predation risk.” Predatory trading enhances systemic
risk since a financial shock to one trader may spill over and trigger a crisis for the
whole financial sector. Consequently, our analysis provides an argument in favor of
coordinated actions by regulators or bailout. Our analysis has further implications for
19The origin of the term “bear” goes back to the 18th century, where it described a trader who sold
the bear’s skin before he had caught it.
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the regulation of securities trading and disclosure rules of large traders, and it explains
the advantages of trading halts, batch auctions, and of the up-tick rule.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we rewrite the objective function (8) as
E
(
λSxi(T )− 1
2
λ
[
xi (T )
]2
+ xi(0)(µ− λS) + 1
2
λxi(0)2
−
∫ T
0
[
λai (t) X−i (t) + G(ai (t) , a−i (t))
]
dt
)
,
where the terms with xi(0) do not depend on the trading strategy. Consider a strategy,
a(·), with xi(T ) < x¯. Since a¯ ≥ A/I, there must be an interval [t′, t′′] such that
a(t) < a¯(t) −  for t ∈ [t′, t′ + t′′]. Consider another strategy aˆ which is the same as
a except that aˆ(t) = a(t) +  for t ∈ [t′, t′′], implying that xˆi(T ) = xi(T ) + (t′′ − t′).
Then, for small enough  the objective function changes by
λ
(
(t′′ − t′)(S − xi(T ))− 1
2
2(t′′ − t′)2 −
∫ t′′
t′
X−i (t) dt
)
≥
λ
(
(t′′ − t′)(S − xi(T )− (I − 1)x¯)− 1
2
2(t′′ − t′)2
)
> 0
where we use that X−i ≤ (I − 1)x¯. This shows that a is not optimal, and hence, any
optimal strategy must have xi(T ) = x¯.
Next, consider a strategy with a(t) ≥ a¯(t) +  for t ∈ [t′, t′ + τ ′]. (The case with
a(t) < a(t) is similar.) Then, the profit can be increased by using another strategy aˆ
which is the same as a except that aˆ(t) = a(t)−  for t ∈ [t′, t′ + τ ′] and aˆ(t) = a(t) + 
on some other interval [t′′, t′′ + τ ′] where a(t) ≤ a¯(t) − . The change in objective
function is
γτ ′ − λ
(∫ t′+τ ′
t′
X−i(t) dt−
∫ t′′+τ ′
t′′
X−i(t) dt
)
≥
τ ′ (γ − λ(I − 1)x¯) > 0
implying that a is not optimal. 
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The distressed trader’s strategy is optimal since any faster liquidation leads to tempo-
rary price impact costs.
The surviving trader, i, wants to minimize
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt subject to the con-
straints that xi(T ) = x¯ and |ai(t)| ≤ A/I. Here, X−i (t) is the position of the trader
in financial trouble so
X−i (t) =
{
x(t0)− t A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + x(t0)I/A]
0 for t > t0 + x(t0)I/A.
Since X−i (t) is decreasing,
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt is minimized by choosing the control
variable as stated in the proposition.
A.3 Proof of Propositions 2 and 2’
Suppose that x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯. A distressed trader’s strategy is optimal, given the other
traders’ actions, since (i) until time t0 + τ , the price is falling and the distressed trader
is selling as fast as he can without incurring temporary impact costs; and (ii) after time
t0 + τ , the price is rising and the distressed trader is selling at the minimal required
speed.
To see the optimality of a predator’s strategy, suppose, without loss of generality,
that trader i is not the trader in financial distress and that all other traders are using
the proposed equilibrium strategies. Then, the total position, X−i (t), of the other
traders is
X−i (t) =
{
(I − 1) (x(t0)− AI t) for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ ]
(Ip − 1) x¯ for t > t0 + τ .
Trader i wants to minimize
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt subject to the constraints that xi(T ) = x¯
and ai(t) ∈ [a, a]. Since X−i (t) is decreasing and then constant, ∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt is
minimized by choosing ai = a as long as X−i (t) is decreasing and by choosing a
positive ai thereafter. Hence, the ai that is described in the proposition is optimal.
We note that trader i’s objective function does not depend on the speed with which
he buys back after time τ . There is a single speed, however, which is consistent with
the equilibrium.
To prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium, we first note that, in any symmetric
equilibrium, X−i(t) must be (weakly) monotonic. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that there exists t′, t′′, and t′′′ such that t′ < t′′ < t′′′ and X−i(t′) < X−i(t′′) and
X−i(t′′) > X−i(t′′′). Since X−i(t′) < X−i(t′′) and since the distressed traders are
selling, the predators must be buying as X−i(t) is arbitrarily close to X−i(t′′) (in a
set of non-zero measure). Further, since X−i(t′′) > X−i(t′′′), ai(t) < a for t arbitrarily
close to t′′′. Hence, trader i can decrease his trading cost (11) by buying less around
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X−i(t′′) and more around X−i(t′′′), while incurring no temporary impact costs and
keeping xi(T ) unchanged. Similar arguments show that there cannot exist t′ < t′′ < t′′′
such that X−i(t′) > X−i(t′′) and X−i(t′′) < X−i(t′′′).
Next, for x(t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, monotonicity of X−i implies that X−i is non-increasing
since X−i(0) ≥ (Ip − 1)x¯ = X−i(T ). It follows directly from Lemma 1 that, as long as
X−i(t) > (Ip − 1) x¯ and t is not too large, an optimal strategy satisfies ai = a, that is,
ai = −A/I. Hence, X˙−i(t) = −A I−1
I
until X−i(t) = (Ip − 1)x¯.
The proof of Proposition 2’ is analogous. In this case, each predator’s X−i(t) is
increasing until it reaches its final level (Ip − 1)x¯ at t0 + τ and is flat thereon, in
equilibrium. That is, from t0 + τ onwards, the sell orders of I
d distressed traders are
exactly offset by the buy orders of Ip − 1 predators. The price dynamics are
p (t) =


p(t0) + λA(t− t0) for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p(t0) + λAτ + λA
Id
I
(
Ip
I(Ip−1)
− 1
)
(t− t0 − τ) for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
µ + λ(S − Ipx¯) for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I ,
(19)
where p(t0) = µ− λ(S − Ix(t0)). 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The size of the overshooting, that is, the difference between the lowest price (which is
achieved at time t0 + τ) and the new equilibrium price is x¯I
d/(I − 1). This difference
decreases towards zero as the number of agents increases, i.e., as I →∞,
x¯Id
I − 1 =
(x¯I)
(
Id/I
)
I − 1 ↘ 0
since x¯I and Id/I are constant. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To show that W
(
Id
)
is increasing in Id, we show that the paper wealth, W i(t, ai, a−i),
at any time t is decreasing in Id. The paper wealth is increasing in the holding, X−i,
of the other traders. With higher Id, more agents are liquidating their entire holding,
reducing X−i. Further, a higher Id implies that the remaining predators reverse from
selling to buying at a later time τ (defined in Proposition 2), which also reduces X−i.

A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Clearly, V paper > V orderly. If there is only one predator, then it follows immediately
from Proposition 1 that V orderly > V distressed. If there are multiple predators, the
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distressed liquidation value is computed using Proposition 2. After tedious calculations,
the result is
V distressed = x(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
Ix(t0)
2 − I
p (Ip − 1)
I − 1 x¯
2
)
. (20)
It follows that V orderly > V distressed under the condition stated in the proposition. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We first note that x(t0) ≥ x¯
√
Ip/I implies that, for all I, x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯. Hence,
Proposition 2 applies and we can use (20) to compute the total distressed liquidation
value:
IdV distressed = Idx(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
IdIx(t0)
2 − (I
p − 1)
I − 1 I
dIpx¯2
)
. (21)
Since Ix(t0), I
px(t0), and I
dx(t0) are assumed independent of I, all the terms in (21)
are independent of I, except the term involving (Ip−1)/(I−1). This term is increasing
in the number of agents, yielding the first result in the proposition. In the limit as the
number of agents increases, the total distressed liquidation value is
Idx(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
IdIx(t0)
2 − I
p
I
IdIpx¯2
)
. (22)
This value is greater than the orderly liquidation value, Idx(t0)
(
p(t0)− 12λIdx(t0)
)
,
under the condition Ix(t0) ≥
√
IpIx¯. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
We give a sketch of the proof. To see the optimality of trader i’s strategy, we first note
that, for any value of xi(t0), it is optimal to use the equilibrium strategy after time
t0. The argument for this follows from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Further,
prior to t0, it is optimal to acquire shares at a rate of a until the trader has reached
his pre-t0 target. This follows from the incentive to acquire the position before other
traders drive up the price.
The equilibrium level of x(t0) is derived in the remainder of the proof. We consider
trader i’s expected profit in connection with buying x(t0) + ∆ shares, given that other
traders buy x(t0) shares. More precisely, we use Lemma 1 and consider how the
marginal ∆ infinitesimal shares affect the “trading cost”
∫
ai(t)X−i(t)dt. First, buying
∆ infinitesimal extra shares prior to time t0 costs ∆(I − 1)x(t0) since the shares are
optimally bought when the other traders have finished buying and X−i = (I − 1)x(t0).
The benefit, after t0, of having bought the ∆ shares depends on whether (i) no
trader is in distress, (ii) another trader is in distress, or (iii) the trader himself is in
distress:
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(i) If no trader is in distress, then having the extra ∆ shares saves a purchase at
the per share cost of X−i = (I − 1)x¯. This is because the marginal shares are bought
in the end when the other (I − 1) traders each have acquired a position of x¯.
(ii) If another trader is in financial distress then having the extra ∆ shares saves
a purchase at the per-share cost of X−i = (I − 2)x¯. This is the total position of the
other I − 2 predators when the defaulting trader has liquidated his entire position.
(iii a) Suppose I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not disclosed at
time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress, the extra ∆ shares can be
sold when X−i = (I − 1)x¯. This is the position of the predators when one has just
finished liquidating. At that time the predators have preyed and re-purchased their
position.
(iii b) Suppose I = 2 or that the position of the distressed trader is disclosed at
time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress, the extra ∆ shares can be
sold when X−i = (I − 2)x¯. To see this, note that the extra shares imply that the
predators prey longer (τ larger) because they know that one must liquidate a larger
position. Hence, the marginal shares are effectively sold at the worst time when X−i
is at its lowest point.
We can now derive the equilibrium x(t0) by imposing the requirement that the
marginal cost of buying the extra shares equals the marginal benefit. In the case in
which I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not disclosed at time t0, we
have
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1− pi)(I − 1)x¯ + piI − 1
I
(I − 2)x¯ + pi 1
I
(I − 1)x¯,
implying that
x(t0) = (1− pi
I
)x¯.
In the case in which I = 2 or the position of the distressed trader is disclosed at time
t0, we have
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1− pi)(I − 1)x¯ + piI − 1
I
(I − 2)x¯ + pi 1
I
(I − 2)x¯,
implying that
x(t0) = (1− pi
I − 1)x¯.
The global optimality of buying x(t0) shares is seen as follows. First, buying fewer
shares than x(t0) is not optimal since the infra-marginal shares are bought cheaper (in
terms of X−i) than (I − 1)x¯ and their expected benefits are at least (I − 1)x¯. Second,
buying more shares than x(t0) costs (I − 1)x¯ per share, and the expected benefit of
these additional shares is at most (I − 1)x¯.
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Finally, we have to show that in both cases x0 >
Ip−1
I−1
x¯, which implies that after
t0 predatory trading occurs as described in Proposition 1 or 2. For the case in which
the position is disclosed, this follows from x (t0) =
(
1− pi
I−1
)
x¯ ≥ (1− 1
I−1
)
x¯ = I
p−1
I−1
x¯.
This is also sufficient for the other case since then x(t0) larger. 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of this proposition follows directly from the insight that, from each predator’s
view point, X−i declines with a constant slope I
p−1
Ip
A and stays flat as soon as it reaches
its final level X−i (T ) = (Ip − 1) x. That front-running implies more costly liquidation
and greater price overshooting follows from (i) that each predator has a smaller position
at all times; (ii) that the lowest total holding of all agents (at time t1) is strictly lower.

A.10 Proof of Proposition 9
The execution price for trader i’s order of ui shares in the batch auction is pa (ui) = µ−
λS +λ (Ip − 1) (x (t0) + u−i)+λ (x (t0) + ui) if all defaulting traders submit sell orders
of size x (t0) and all other predators submit a total buy order of u
−i = (Ip−1)u, where
u is the equilibrium predator buy order in the auction (to be determined). Since X−i
is increasing after the auction, trader i optimally buys the remaining [x− x (t0)− ui]
shares at the highest trading intensity A/Ip. If ui ≥ u, these buy orders are executed
at an average price of pa + 1
2
λIp [x− x (t0)− ui]. Deriving the total cost and taking the
first order condition w.r.t. ui yields an optimal auction order of ui = I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)]. If
ui < u, then predator i must buy more shares after the auction than the other predators.
The first u shares are bought at an average price of pa + 1
2
λIp [x− x (t0)− u] and the
last u−ui ones are bought at an average price of pa +λIp [x− x (t0)− u]+ 12λ (u− ui).
Taking the first order condition w.r.t. ui evaluated at ui = u, we find the same
optimality condition as above: ui = u = I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)].
The equilibrium auction price is pa = µ − λS + λ (Ip − 1) x + λx (t0). The price
overshooting is λ (x¯− x (t0)), which is smaller than the price overshooting without
batch auction, λ I
d
I−1
x¯ for Ip ≥ 2 and λx for Ip = 1 (Propositions 1 and 2, respectively).

B Noisy Asset Supply
In this section, we consider an economy in which (i) agents can condition on prices and
(ii) the supply of assets is noisy. In a pure strategy equilibrium, an agent cannot learn
from prices if another trader deviated from his equilibrium strategy. This is because,
in equilibrium, any price change is ascribed to supply uncertainty. This feature of the
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noisy supply equilibrium is the justification for the equilibrium concept described in
Definition 1. We show that the equilibrium strategies for the non-noisy economy also
constitute an equilibrium in a corresponding game with noisy supply.
We assume that the supply, St, is a Brownian motion with volatility σ, that is,
dSt = σdWt,
where W is a standard Brownian motion. Agent i maximizes his expected wealth:
max
a( · )∈A
E
(
−
∫ T
0
ai(t)p(t)dt + xi(T )v
)
, (23)
where A is the set of {Ft}-adapted processes and {Ft} is generated by the price process
{pt}, the distress indicator Ip 1(t≥t0) and by G (ai(t), a−i(t)). The price is defined as
before by p (t) = µ − λ (St −X (t)), where S0 > x¯I. We use the definition p¯ (t) =
µ− λ (S0 −X (t)). With this definition, the agent’s objective function can be written
as
E
(
xi(T )v −
∫ T
0
[ai(t)p(t) + G
(
ai(t), a−i(t)
)
]dt+
)
=
E
(
xi(T )v −
∫ T
0
[ai(t)p¯(t) + G
(
ai(t), a−i(t)
)
]dt
)
+ E
∫ T
0
ai(t) [p¯(t)− p(t)] dt.
The first term on the right-hand side is the same as the objective function with a
constant supply of S0. Hence, this term is maximized by the equilibrium strategy if all
other agents use the equilibrium strategy. The second term is, as we show next, zero
under an additional assumption. For any {Ft}-adapted process, a, it holds that
E
∫ T
0
ai(t) [p¯(t)− p(t)] dt
= λE
∫ T
0
ai(t) [S0 − St] dt
= λE
∫ T
0
ai(t) [ST − St] dt− λE
(∫ T
0
ai(t)dt [ST − S0]
)
= λE
∫ T
0
ai(t)Et [ST − St] dt− λE
(∫ T
0
ai(t)dt [ST − S0]
)
= −λE
(∫ T
0
ai(t)dt [ST − S0]
)
.
If we assume that the agent must choose a strategy with x¯ = xT = x0 +
∫ T
0
ai(t)dt,
then the last term is zero. This assumption means that the agent must end up fully
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invested in the asset. We note that the agent would optimally choose xT = x¯ as long
as S is not too small, and S is close to S0 with large probability if σ is small.
Even if we do not impose the additional assumption that xT = x¯, we can show
that the equilibrium in the model without supply uncertainty is an ε-equilibrium in
the model with noisy supply. (See Radner (1980) for a discussion of ε-equilibria.) This
property of the strategies follows from the fact that the latter term can be bounded as
follows ∣∣∣∣E
(∫ T
0
ai(t)dt [ST − S0]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ E
(∫ T
0
∣∣ai(t)∣∣ dt |ST − S0|
)
≤ E
(∫ T
0
A dt |ST − S0|
)
≤ AT E |ST − S0|
= AT σ E |WT −W0|
→ 0 as σ → 0.
Hence, agent i’s maximal gain from deviating from the strategy of the non-noisy game
approaches 0 as the supply uncertainty vanishes (σ → 0).
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Table 1: Examples of risks associated with predatory trading.
Issue Source Quotation
Enron, UBS
Warburg
AFX News Limited,
AFX - Asia, Jan-
uary 18, 2002.
UBS Warburg’s proposal to take over Enron’s traders without tak-
ing over the trading book was opposed on the ground that “it
would present a ‘predatory trading risk’, as Enron traders effec-
tively know the contents of the trading book.”
Disclosure IAFE Investor Risk
Committee (IRC)
(2001)
“For large portfolios, granular disclosure is far from costless and
can be ruinous. Large funds need to limit granularity of reporting
sufficiently to protect against predatory trading.”
Predation,
LTCM
Business Week,
2/26/01
“If lenders know that a hedge fund needs to sell something quickly,
they will sell the same asset – driving the price down even faster.
Goldman Sachs and counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in
1998. (Goldman admits it was a seller but says it acted honorably
and had no confidential information.)”
LTCM New York Times
Magazine, 1/24/99
Meriwether quoting another LTCM principal: “the hurricane is
not more or less likely to hit because more hurricane insurance
has been written. In financial markets this is not true ... because
the people who know you have sold the insurance can make it
happen.”
Systemic
risk
Testimony of Alan
Greenspan, U.S.
House of Represen-
tatives, 10/1/98
“It was the judgment of officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, who were monitoring the situation on an ongoing basis,
that the act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio in a forced liquida-
tion would not only have a significant distorting impact on market
prices but also in the process could produce large losses, or worse,
for a number of creditors and counterparties, and for other market
participants who were not directly involved with LTCM.”
Hedge funds
as predators
Cramer (2002) P. 182: “When you smell blood in the water, you become a shark.
... when you know that one of your number is in trouble ... you
try to figure out what he owns and you start shorting those stocks
...” P. 200: “even though brokers are never supposed to ‘give up’
their clients’ names, there is something about a dying client that
sent these brokers to go to the untapped pay phone ... and tell
their buddies...”
Credit Gen-
eral
Harvard Business
School case 9-26-011
by Andre F. Perold
In June 1995, Credit General buys a yard (billion pounds) of ster-
ling from a client, an unusually large amount. Then, “Credit Gen-
eral immediately moved to execute the trade as planned, attempt-
ing to sell the yard sterling for marks. However, the sterling market
suddenly seemed to have ‘evaporated.’ The price of sterling fell
rapidly, as did liquidity.
Askin/
Granite
Hedge Fund
collapse
1994
Friedman, Kaplan,
Seiler & Adelman
LLP
“[during] the period around which the rumors as to the Funds’
difficulties were circulating, DLJ quickly repriced the securities
resulting in significant margin deficits. ... The court also cited ev-
idence that Merrill may have improperly diverted profits to itself.”
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Table 1, continued: Examples of risks associated with predatory trading.
Issue Source Quotation
Predation Securities Week,
11/11/91
“...knowledge that other customers intend to sell large amounts of
stock should a specified decline occur in the stock’s price... the
dishonest customer’s stock selling will trigger ... selling done by
other customers ... result in a large decline in the stock’s price.”
Market
making
Financial Times
(London),
6/5/1990, section I,
page 12.
UK market makers wanted to keep the right to delay reporting of
large transactions since this would give them “a chance to reduce
a large exposure, rather than alerting the rest of the market and
exposing them to predatory trading tactics from others.”
Crash 1987 Brady Report “This precipitous decline began with several “triggers,” which ig-
nited mechanical, price-insensitive selling by a number of insti-
tutions following portfolio insurance strategies and a small num-
ber of mutual fund groups. The selling by these investors, and
the prospect of further selling by them, encouraged a number of
aggressive trading-oriented institutions to sell in anticipation of
further declines. These aggressive trading-oriented institutions in-
cluded, in addition to hedge funds, a small number of pension
and endowment funds, money management firms and investment
banking houses. This selling in turn stimulated further reactive
selling by portfolio insurers and mutual funds.”
Corners
and short-
squeezes
Jarrow (1992) “Famous market manipulations, corners, and short-squeezes form
an important part of American securities industry folklore. Col-
orful episodes include the collapse of a gold corner on Black Fri-
day, September 24, 1869, corners on the Northern Pacific Railroad
(1901), Stultz Motor Car Company (1920), and the Radio Corpo-
ration of America (1928). More recent alleged corners include the
soy bean market (1977 and 1989), silver market (1979-1980), tin
market (1981-1982 and 1984-1985), and the Treasury bond market
(1986). All of these episodes were characterized by extraordinary
price increases followed by dramatic collapses ...”
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